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SHARED HISTORIES: THE FEMINIST AND GAY
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS FOR FREEDOM IN PUBLIC
Elizabeth Sepper *
Deborah Dinner **
INTRODUCTION
This Symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of the Stonewall Rebellion presents the opportunity to evaluate the regulation and deregulation of gender and sexuality in public space. In 1969, LGBTQ
people erupted against policing, harassment, and exclusion in public spaces. While they had engaged in earlier, smaller protests and
reforms, Stonewall ignited a mass gay liberation movement and
sparked popular awareness of LGBTQ people’s civil rights struggles. LGBTQ activists demanded their rights to express identity,
associate with one another, and engage in queer behavior. That
same year, the newly burgeoning feminist movement also launched
protests and called for women’s equality in public accommodations—the legal term of art for places open to the public.1 These
groups shared a history of regulation. Customary business practices, the discriminatory administration of liquor licensing laws,
and limited protections against discrimination all denied LGBTQ
people and heterosexual women alike the freedoms that heterosexual men enjoyed in public space. As they resisted this regulation,
LGBTQ people and cisgender women won mutually reinforcing legal reforms.
To understand the dramatic change in social custom and law
regulating gender and sexuality over the last half century requires
examining the historical regulation and deregulation of cisgender
* Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Thank you to participants in the University of Richmond Law Review Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of
the Stonewall Riots. We thank Athena Dufour, Chris Marple, and the staff of the University
of Richmond Law Review for their superb organization and editing.
1. For a full exploration of feminist advocacy during the late 1960s and 1970s, see
Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 80–81 (2019).
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women and of LGBTQ people together. Risa Goluboff has led the
charge against siloed accounts of social movements and socio-legal
change, arguing against historical narratives that treat subordinated groups as distinct and in pursuit of discrete goals.2 By instead synthesizing the histories of social movements, Goluboff
shows that we gain better understanding of how social and legal
structures of hierarchy and oppression “worked [and] how they
then fell apart.”3 Heeding this call, this Article offers a close examination of dual case studies of feminist and gay and lesbian activism, in the period from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s.
While we leave a more comprehensive account of socio-legal
change to future work, this Article offers two insights into what we
might learn from an integrative socio-legal history of feminist and
LGBTQ public accommodations activism. The Article’s first insight
is that the regulation of cisgender women and LGBTQ people
stemmed from common sources of law. In the late 1960s, a system
of gender and sexual regulation structured access to public accommodations. Public authorities and private businesses targeted unescorted heterosexual women, gay people, and gender nonconformists for particular scrutiny. For each of these groups, policing was
justified by fears of their sexuality, perceived to threaten to the
hetero-patriarchal family.
An array of public accommodations, from athletic clubs to credit
institutions, presumed women’s heterosexuality and dependence
on men.4 Women often needed to perform their heterosexual dependency to eat and drink in public. By custom, and in some states
by law, women could only sit (or stand) at a bar if escorted by a
man.5 Bar owners and legislators justified the practice by depicting
unescorted women as prostitutes or seductresses and by referencing men’s alleged need for leisure spaces free of heterosexual distraction.6 Male-escort requirements also limited the ways in which
women could associate with each other in public, preventing

2. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 335 (2016).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Georgina Hickey, Barred from the Barroom: Second Wave Feminists and Public Accommodations in U.S. Cities, 34 FEMINIST STUD. 382, 382 (2008); Sepper & Dinner, supra
note 1, at 91–93.
6. Sepper & Dinner, supra note 1, at 115–21.
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women from grabbing a drink with other women, whether a platonic friend or romantic interest.
Similar motivations—to impose dominant gender norms and
morality—underpinned widespread restrictions on LGBTQ people.
Insurance companies, credit institutions, and banks perceived homosexual people as inherently risky and therefore denied them
services. Anti-cross-dressing regulations in a wide array of public
accommodations were designed to prevent people from straying
(too far) from a binary of gendered dress. Liquor licensing authorities interpreted the mere presence of gay men in bars, as they had
unescorted women, as threats to the “normal red-blooded man.”7
These same authorities used licensing laws to shut down gay and
lesbian bars, denying these communities the refuge of separate
spaces.8 Even when gay patrons did not engage in conduct that violated prohibitions on immoral acts, licensing authorities interpreted their association in public to “present[] . . . a definite social
problem.”9 The arrest, and even just the outing, of perceived sexual
minorities seriously undermined their employability and housing
prospects.
This Article’s second insight is that feminist and LGBTQ people’s respective fights for equality in public reinforced one another.
In the late 1970s, civil rights law offered no assistance to either
group. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited race, national origin, and religious discrimination—but not sex discrimination—in specified categories of public accommodations.10 State
laws that dated to Reconstruction barred race, color, and national
origin discrimination.11 Before 1969, however, no state or city law
prohibited sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity discrimination in public accommodations.
7. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d
12, 14 (N.J. 1967).
8. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 870–72 (1997) (describing harassment by liquor licensing agents and police in
New York and San Francisco).
9. One Eleven Wines, 235 A.2d at 14; see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced
Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
1015, 1133–35, 1141 (1999) (summarizing cases involving the use of liquor licensing authorities against gay and lesbian bars).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
11. Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 215, 238–40 (1978).
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Beginning in the 1960s, the LGBTQ and feminist movements
pursued court battles and legal reforms for equality and liberty in
public. They ensured that liquor licensing no longer targeted cisgender women and LGBTQ people. Virtually all states came to
adopt public accommodations laws prohibiting sex discrimination
and twenty-four explicitly included sexual orientation as well.12
This history shows that the feminist and gay liberation movements’ public accommodations advocacy was linked rather than independent. Each movement built on each other’s legal victories in
ways that were cyclical and mutually reinforcing. Putting feminist
and LGBTQ activism together enables us better to see how gender
and sexuality were inherently intertwined.
This Article explores two case studies of public accommodations
activism: New Jersey in the late 1960s and California in the mid1980s. Part I begins just before Stonewall as an emerging doctrinal
distinction between status and conduct began to ensure rights of
LGBTQ people to associate in public space. In 1967, in One Eleven
Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the mere fact that gay men
congregated in a bar did not establish immoral conduct in violation
of a liquor licensing regime.13 Women’s rights advocates, in turn,
successfully used this gay rights precedent to challenge sex-based
regulation of cisgender women in Gallagher v. Bayonne. Put together, these judicial decisions involving gay men and women highlight a common history of policing and surveillance of gender and
sexuality in public. The decisions challenge the conventional periodization of civil rights, showing how LGBTQ liberation laid a
foundation for feminist legal advances.
Part II takes us to California in the period from the mid-1970s
through the 1980s, when activists began to demand not only access
to public spaces but also the right to express their identities openly.
Having achieved a status-conduct distinction in the courts, feminist and gay liberation movements pursued legislative reforms
that would explicitly guarantee full and equal enjoyment of public
accommodations. Activists successfully lobbied for the addition of
“sex” to the California law barring arbitrary exclusion from public

12. State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr.
8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodat
ion-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/N67T-B3A5].
13. One Eleven Wines, 235 A.2d at 19.
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businesses and then used the law to challenge the gender regulation of both cisgender women and LGBTQ people. To illustrate this
process, we analyze the case of Rolón v. Kulwitzky, in which a lesbian couple who were denied a celebratory Valentine’s Day dinner
won rights to express their identities in public. The case offers insight into how one couple experienced subordination in public,
highlights points of intersection between activism for sex equality
and sexual freedom, and illustrates conservative resistance to the
deregulation of gender.
These episodes—offering an entry point into the history of liquor
licensing in New Jersey and public accommodations law in California—highlight that feminist and LGBTQ legal victories evolved cyclically and interdependently, rather than in a linear and isolated
manner. Rights development proceeded from gay liberation to
women’s rights and vice versa. Struggles for sex equality and gay
and lesbian liberation in public were intertwined rather than independent.
I. LIQUOR LICENSING, SEXUAL RISK, AND GENDER REGULATION:
THE STORY OF ONE ELEVEN AND BAYONNE
Nearly two years before the Stonewall rebellion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s ruling in One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control affirmed the rights of gay men
to socialize with each other in bars.14 Swiftly, One Eleven Wines led
to a victory for women in public too. Analogizing straight women
to gay men, a series of New Jersey courts struck down a law that
prohibited women from standing at a bar, finding the law beyond
the police power to regulate liquor, in Gallagher v. Bayonne.15 Issued when gay liberation was just stirring and when the feminist
movement was still forming, these decisions represent early court
victories for the respective movements.
From the repeal of Prohibition through the 1950s, liquor licensing had acted as a formidable system to surveil and discipline gender and sexuality in public space.16 Public authorities and private
businesses policed, harassed, excluded, and marginalized unes-

14. Id. at 12.
15. 245 A.2d 373, 375–76 (N.J. 1968).
16. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 867.
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corted heterosexual women, gay people, and gender nonconformists on the grounds that their sexual identities and gender performance presented moral risks.17
One Eleven Wines and Bayonne formed part of a nationwide
trend in state courts toward skepticism of expansive police power
over behavior in public accommodations. Decided at a time when
the expansion of the Equal Protection doctrine and the enactment
of civil rights statutes heightened attention to the injuries that
morals regulation inflicted on subordinated groups, the decisions
affirmed both individual liberty and group association. They manifested an emergent distinction between status and conduct that
allowed cautious steps toward freedom for unescorted heterosexual
women, gay people, and gender nonconformists.
A. A Trajectory from Gay Liberation to Women’s Rights in New
Jersey
With One Eleven Wines, New Jersey courts faced a challenge to
an administrative licensing regime that restricted the formation of
gay community in public. As part of a nationwide crackdown on
gay bars throughout the 1950s and 1960s, New Jersey regulators
had suspended the licenses of Murphy’s Tavern, Val’s Bar, and One
Eleven Wines.18 The bars fought the suspensions, arguing that the
mere congregation of homosexual people did not constitute “lewd
or immoral” conduct prohibited by liquor licensing regulations.19
Their efforts drew the support of the Mattachine Society, an early
gay political organization founded in 1951 to educate the public
about homosexuality and to secure legal reforms.20 Mattachine
members, who had coordinated a 1966 “sip-in” that prodded New
York City licensing authorities to allow gay men to congregate in

17. Id.
18. Whitney Strub & Timothy Stewart-Winter, Remembering One Eleven Wines, a PreStonewall Win Against Homophobic State Surveillance, SLATE: OUTWARD (Nov. 30, 2017,
1:27 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/11/remembering-one-eleven-wines-liquors
-a-pre-stonewall-win-against-homophobic-state-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/ERN86K4Z].
19. One Eleven Wines, 235 A.2d at 15, 19.
20. JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970, at 57–58 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the “homosexual emancipation movement” that began to take root in the 1950s).
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bars and restaurants, wrote an amicus brief supporting the bars
that would prove similarly influential in One Eleven Wines.21
The New Jersey litigation formed part of the periodic legal resistance by gay and lesbian bars to their policing and closure by
alcohol regulators. One of these legal challenges yielded what is
thought to be the nation’s first successful gay rights case—Stoumen v. Reilly—when, in 1951, the California Supreme Court sided
with the Black Cat bar against liquor regulators.22 The California
Board of Equalization had revoked Black Cat’s license for allegedly
violating the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which prohibited the
use of a liquor license to maintain a “disorderly house for purposes
injurious to public morals.”23 The court held that the fact that “persons of known homosexual tendencies patronized [Black Cat] and
used [it] as a meeting place” was not itself evidence of illegal or
immoral conduct.24
Nonetheless, successful challenges to license revocation remained rare or of limited effect.25 As they had since the repeal of
Prohibition, courts still treated police power over liquor distribution as extraordinarily far-reaching, insulating liquor regulation
from charges of unconstitutional vagueness, deprivation of due
process, and rights infringement.26 As precedent seemed to require, the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld the bars’ license
suspensions as consistent with the exercise of police power.

21. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 872–73 (noting influence of brief); Photos: LGBT Advocates Honor 52nd Anniversary of Historic “Sip-In” with Trailblazer Dick Leitsch and Advocate/Influencer Adam Eli, NYC LGBT HISTORIC SITES PROJECT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://
www.nyclgbtsites.org/2018/04/26/photos-lgbt-advocates-honor-52nd-anniversary-of-histor
ic-sip-in-with-trailblazer-dick-leitsch-and-advocateinfluencer-adam-eli/ [https://perma.cc/8
Y2H-U6UY].
22. 234 P.2d 969, 969, 971 (Cal. 1951) (addressing an appeal from the denial of a writ
of mandamus to compel the California Board of Equalization to annul an order suspending
its liquor license). On the description as a pioneering gay rights decision, see CRAIG A.
RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 49 (2002).
23. Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 970.
24. Id.
25. See generally Rivera, supra note 9, at 1132–43 (summarizing cases involving the
use of liquor licensing authorities against gay and lesbian bars). Resistance was not universal. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 869 (discussing crackdown in Dade County that resulted in
closure of Miami’s gay and lesbian bars but without a single reported decision in the late
1950s and early 1960s).
26. Rivera, supra note 9, at 1133 (discussing theories courts used to uphold such regulation).

SEPPER DINNER (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2020 1:16 PM

766

[Vol. 54:759

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

In One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the New Jersey Supreme Court—then emerging as
a leader in progressive state constitutional doctrine—bucked prior
doctrine to embrace the rights of gay patrons.27 Several courts had
recently restrained liquor licensing authorities, and the California
Supreme Court had even recognized gays’ constitutional rights to
public space, but it did so in a way that prohibited them from “any
public display which manifests sexual desires,” from pairing off, to
gender-nonconforming dress, to dancing or kissing.28 Justice Jacobs writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court went much further.29 While the case was nominally about commercial licensing,
the court focused on the injury to gay customers and linked the
case to the Warren Court’s contemporaneous rights revolution.30
Just as regulation of the NAACP threatened the rights of African
Americans, the court reasoned, suspension of the bars’ licenses violated the rights of gay citizens.31 Gay people had “the undoubted
right to congregate in public” and to “be viewed as having the equal
right to congregate within licensed establishments such as taverns, restaurants and the like.”32
The court drew a distinction between the status of homosexuality (or gender nonconformity) and the conduct of lewd behavior.
The court did not treat the regulation of morality through liquor
licensing as outside the bounds of judicial power, subject to minimal oversight.33 Instead, Justice Jacobs’s opinion dismantled each
of the government’s justifications for the regulation as lacking any

27. Leigh B. Bienen, “A Good Murder”, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 585, 590 (1993) (“[T]he
New Jersey Supreme Court has had a history of being a leader in the development of state
constitutional doctrine.”); see also John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948–
1998: Fifty Years of Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 703–04 (1998) (recounting court’s significant decisions requiring more equitable school funding, striking
down zoning restrictions that restricted the ability to build low and moderate income housing, and imposing strict liability for products liability).
28. Vallerga v. Dep’t Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1959).
29. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 872–73 (calling One Eleven Wines “the most dramatic
litigation” against licensing authorities).
30. Id.
31. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d
12, 18 (N.J. 1967) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458 (1958)). The court also cited
constitutional standing cases in Griswold v. Connecticut (physicians and women seeking
contraception), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (private schools and parental rights), Barrows v.
Jackson (homeowner in a private suit for violating racially restrictive covenant and racial
minorities). Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19.
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“significant support.”34 Homosexual identity alone would not
amount to lewd or immoral conduct for licensing purposes.35 Nor
did gender deviance—in the form of allegedly campy behavior,
high-pitched voices, and dress—suffice.36 If individuals engaged in
specific lewd behavior or solicitation, the government could bring
those charges, but only where the same behavior of heterosexuals
would also be banned.37
The liberatory potential of One Eleven Wines extended beyond
gays and lesbians. For litigants in Bayonne, New Jersey, the decision immediately offered a tool to destabilize regulation of heterosexual women. In 1967, any woman who approached a bar in Bayonne to order a drink was turned away. By city ordinance, women
could not stand or sit at a bar or be served alcoholic beverages unless seated at a table.38 Motivated by “some unfortunate experiences . . . in taverns and bars” involving women and enlisted navy
men during World War II, the ordinance dated from 1943.39 But
voters had proved unwilling to let it go. Just as One Eleven Wines
was decided, they had rejected a proposal supported by the Bayonne Tavern Owners Association to permit women at the bar—
for the second time in seven years.40
Edward P. Gallagher, who owned The Pub, and Ann Gunsiorowski, a female “taxpayer of Bayonne,” sued for a declaratory
judgment that the ordinance was invalid.41 They mounted two distinct arguments. First, the ordinance exceeded the city’s police
powers.42 Second, the ordinance amounted to sex discrimination in
violation of the New Jersey Constitution and civil rights act.43 Eliz-

34. Id. at 18–19.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 19.
38. Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 256 A.2d 61, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
39. Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 245 A.2d 373, 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
40. No Women on Bayonne Bar Stools, JERSEY J. (Farians Papers) Nov. 15, 1967. The
taverns’ interests were primarily deregulatory, and they had resources the nascent feminist
movement then lacked. Accord William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2165 (2002) (“Unlike individual gay people, the bars had resources . . . .”).
41. Bayonne, 256 A.2d at 61. The suit was filed in March of 1966 but only reached pretrial conference in November 1967. Trial Slated for Women at Bar Suit, JERSEY J. (Farians
Papers) Nov. 7, 1967.
42. Bayonne, 256 A.2d at 61.
43. Id.
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abeth “Betty” Farians—an early feminist activist who subsequently founded the New Jersey chapter of the National Organization for Women (“NOW”)—pointed the plaintiffs’ lawyers to the
equal rights provision of the state constitution.44 According to Farians, the plaintiffs’ lawyers found that a case had yet to be brought
under the provision.45
The plaintiffs faced an uphill battle on both claims. At the time
the case was filed, “a long line of cases” supported wide-ranging
exercise of the police power against liquor licensees.46 Most damning of the plaintiffs’ claim was a 1954 New Jersey Appellate Division decision in Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.47 That decision upheld a similar Camden ordinance on the
rationale that as a place “normally frequented by men,” the bar
area invited “commingling” in “an informal atmosphere in which
all too often the usual amenities and restraints do not prevail.”48
Women’s entry into such a space would both disrupt the socialization among men and risk immorality. Eskridge—the Bayonne
plaintiffs admitted—seemed “dispositive of the issue we raise
here.”49
The sex discrimination claim also appeared to have little traction. The New Jersey Constitution and the state civil rights act did
not explicitly bar sex discrimination in public accommodations.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any state supreme
court or federal court of appeals had struck down any sex classification as violating women’s rights to equal protection,50 although
44. Memorandum from E.J. Farians to All Stout-Hearted Women and Their Friends
(July 10, 1968) [hereinafter E.J. Farians Memorandum] (on file with DeCrow Papers) (“No
one in the legal profession involved in the case seemed to be aware of the equal rights article
in the N.J. State Constitution until it was pointed out to them by me. After checking, the
plaintiff’s lawyer found that no case had been brought under this article.”). Farians convened the first NOW New Jersey chapter meeting in April 1968, noting that it was “high
time” the chapter got organized given issues of “large magnitude” like the Bar Stool Case.
Letter from Elizabeth Farians to Potential New Jersey NOW Members (Mar. 15, 1968) (on
file with Farians Papers).
45. E.J. Farians Memorandum, supra note 44.
46. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff at 4, Bayonne, 245 A.2d 373 (No. C-1956-65) (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1968) (on file with Farians Papers).
47. 105 A.2d 6, 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954) (“Ordinances which forbid the serving
of liquor to women except when seated at tables do not violate any constitutional right of
either the licensee or the women . . . .”).
48. Id. at 10 (quoting Holderness v. Orange, Bulletin 257, Item 1).
49. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff, supra note 46, at 6.
50. The Supreme Court would do so for the first time in 1971. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76–77 (1971) (striking down the preference under Idaho law for male over female kin as
estate administrators).
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several district courts had done so.51 Courts still uniformly held
that the differential treatment of women in establishments serving
liquor posed no constitutional concern.52 Indeed, nineteen years
earlier, the Supreme Court in Goesaert v. Cleary had upheld a state
law prohibiting women from bartending on the basis that the Constitution did not “preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes . . . in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic.”53
But just as the Bayonne case was scheduled for trial, One Eleven
Wines caused the legal ground to shift. The plaintiffs argued that
the decision stood for the “dramatic new concept” that “where the
rights of citizens come into conflict with liquor control,” the government had a duty to adopt narrow regulations and “must not restrict
beyond the public need.”54 The old rule—requiring only “any semblance of relationship between the restriction and the public
need”—was no longer valid.55 Eskridge, which showed “little or no
consideration for the rights of the individuals involved,” had to be
read as overruled.56 The new rights-protective approach should apply to court review of liquor regulation generally.
The briefing highlights a surprising trajectory, as the recognition of rights of gay men paved the way for heterosexual women.
The plaintiffs’ brief read, “[T]he facts in our case are so analogous
to those of One Eleven Wines that the word ‘woman’ could be substituted for ‘homosexual’ throughout the opinion with little or no
loss of sense.”57 The explicit analogy was striking. The parties
might have distanced women from gay men to avoid the stigma of
sexual immorality,58 but they instead emphasized the fear of sexuality common to restrictions on women and gays.59 For both groups,

51. See, e.g., Karczewski v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 274 F. Supp. 169, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408–09 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per curiam) (respectively striking down statutes barring women from jury service and permitting only husbands to sue for
loss of consortium).
52. But see White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 730 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
54. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff, supra note 46, at 8, 11–12.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 12–13.
58. See Representing the Unpopular Client, 72 L. LIBR. J. 674, 689 (1979).
59. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff, supra note 46, at 13 (providing a chart that details the
similarities in the One Eleven Wines and Bayonne cases).
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the plaintiffs’ brief read, an absolute prohibition was overinclusive.60 The presumption of immorality attached to each group had
to give way to individualized inquiry.
Judge Robert A. Matthews agreed.61 One Eleven Wines had limited liquor licensing authorities to “a rule of reason instead of arbitrary fiat” and required looking to “the rights of individual patrons
who desire access to licensed premises.”62 Judge Matthews therefore focused on how the prohibition regulated women, rather than
its consequences for bars.63 As in One Eleven Wines, an amorphous
need to ensure morality purported to justify the restriction. The
court observed wryly that in the city’s view, “the mingling of males
and females at a bar is in some manner deleterious to the morals
of the community.”64 Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, Judge
Matthews took a skeptical view of the “supporting data” for Bayonne’s ordinance.65 He insisted that the city structure any regulation so as to “not impair the rights of women to patronize licensed
premises.”66 A purported risk to morality did not justify women’s
total exclusion from the bar.
Matthews’s decision also embraced the plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims. The New Jersey Civil Rights Act protected individuals’ equal enjoyment of and access to public accommodations.67 Under the New Jersey Constitution, “No person shall be denied the
enjoyment of any civil . . . right, nor be discriminated against in the
exercise of any civil . . . right, . . . because of religious principles,
race, color, ancestry or national origin.”68 Person, the equal rights
amendment to the constitution specified, “shall be taken to include
both sexes.”69 The court held that the two constitutional provisions
“together with” the public accommodations statute led “to the con-

60. Id. at 14.
61. Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 245 A.2d 373, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
62. Id. at 375.
63. Id. at 377 (describing the ordinance as unconstitutional and violative of the civil
rights act in that it “prohibits females from being served at public bars”).
64. Id. at 375.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 376–77; see also id. at 376 (“[T]here has been no factual showing before me
(and I am sure there cannot be) which can support the legal necessity for the ordinance . . . .”).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-4 (West 1964); Bayonne, 245 A.2d at 376.
68. Bayonne, 245 A.2d at 376 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5).
69. Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. X, § 4).
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clusion that the people and the legislature have created a clear prohibition against discrimination in this area of civil rights based on
sex.”70 Like One Eleven Wines, the Bayonne decision showcased a
new awareness of the impact of morality regulation on minority
groups.
Judge Matthews’s opinion drew upon a distinction between biological sex and social gender roles that feminist social scientists
were then advancing.71 Matthews observed, “No doubt there are
those who would seek to polarize men and women on the basis of
sex differentiation alone, and to whom maleness would represent
crude masculinity and femaleness fainting femininity.”72 He proceeded to issue “a signal for caution,” however, to those “who
would look no further than genital difference as a general support
for classification on the basis of sex . . . under law.”73 Writing a
memorandum to other feminists, Farians flagged this “lengthy polemic concerning the nature of humanity”74 and its androgyny,
whereby each person reflects characteristics that “we have been
too prone to oversimplify and relegate to categories labeled male or
female.”75 In its openness to variance in gender identity, rather
than tight linkage between male anatomy and masculinity, Judge
Matthews’s opinion contained a foundation for future liberation.
Ultimately, however, the outcome would not rest on constitutional or civil rights grounds. Preferring to avoid arguments based
on sex discrimination, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
holding in Bayonne on the grounds that the city ordinance involved

70. Id. at 376. The judge adopted a reading of the statute and constitution that was
consistent with progressive readings of civil rights protections at the time but seems foreign
to lawyers fifty years later. The New Jersey Civil Rights Act does specify, as Judge Matthews wrote, that “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation” including
taverns. Id. at 375 (quoting § 18:25-4 (West 1964)) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-5 (West
1964)). But in a section the judge omitted, it continued “without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, or age, subject only to conditions and limitations
applicable alike to all persons.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-4 (West 1964). The constitutional
provision likewise spoke in terms of denial of civil rights “because of” a list of protected traits
that did not include sex. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5. If the New Jersey Constitution and civil
rights act had protected against sex discrimination in public accommodations, they would
have been the first in the country to do so.
71. Joanne Meyerowitz, A History of “Gender,” 113 AM. HIST. REV. 1346, 1353–55
(2008).
72. Bayonne, 245 A.2d at 376.
73. Id.
74. E.J. Farians Memorandum, supra note 44, at 1.
75. Bayonne, 245 A.2d at 376.
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an unreasonable exercise of police power.76 But its opinion also resonated with sex equality arguments. The rationale in One Eleven
Wines, the appellate court reasoned, equally applied to women’s
treatment in taverns: “In these enlightened days of the 1960s the
fact that women congregate and are served at bars cannot be said
to be a threat to the health, safety and welfare of the public.”77 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously affirmed.78 Where
rights were at stake, the police power had to be narrowed. No
longer did mere membership in a group—gay men, heterosexual
women—suffice to restrict the freedom of individuals to move and
congregate in public under the liquor licensing power.
B. The Regulation of Gender Through Liquor Licensing
One Eleven Wines and Bayonne marked a significant shift. For
much of the twentieth century, dominant society denied women
and gay people the freedoms granted to heterosexual men in public
space, particularly in places where alcohol was served.79 Prohibition had offered a brief reprieve. Speakeasies and other establishments permitted “flouting of social convention” and “‘promiscuous’
and unregulated intermingling of the classes and sexes.”80 Gender
nonconformists—fairies and female impersonators in the parlance
of the day—enjoyed some measure of tolerance in the social life of
large cities.81 Whereas previously most respectable women drank
only at home if at all,82 and a woman alone in a drinking establishment was assumed a prostitute, during Prohibition middle- and
76. Gallagher v. Bayonne, 256 A.2d 61, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969), aff’d, 259
A.2d 912 (N.J. 1969).
77. Id.
78. Bayonne, 259 A.2d at 912.
79. See PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 74 (2000) (noting similarities in confining cisgender women and gay men and lesbians to the privacy of their homes for reasons of gender
roles and immorality).
80. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING
OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890–1940, at 335 (1994).
81. JULIO CAPO, JR., WELCOME TO FAIRYLAND: QUEER MIAMI BEFORE 1940, at 237, 256–
57 (2017) (noting the ways that LGBTQ people thrived in Miami during Prohibition and in
that city even after Repeal into the 1940s); LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT
LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 62–80 (1991) (describing exploration of bisexuality and homosexuality and cross-racial interaction during
the 1920s sexual revolution in New York City); HUGH RYAN, WHEN BROOKLYN WAS QUEER
111 (2019) (discussing the burgeoning queer public scene in New York in the 1920s and
1930s aided by Prohibition).
82. See, e.g., Madisonville v. Price, 94 S.W. 32, 33 (Ky. 1906) (upholding a city ordinance
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upper-class women began to drink and socialize in public establishments.83
As public consternation about the erosion of sexual norms intensified, the twilight days of Prohibition saw efforts to impose gender
lines. With the participation of middle- and upper-class women in
nightlife, establishments came to require escorts or to place physical barriers between unacquainted men and women.84 Restaurants, bars, and other amusements invited women in, but then, as
historian Kathy Peiss argues, simply “reformulated women’s subordination,” requiring women to define themselves by “heterosexual and marital relationships.”85 To encourage Prohibition’s repeal,
a number of states began to limit the congregation of unpopular
groups. For example, New York City forbade serving “a drink to a
single homosexual or to allow homosexuals to gather” on the rationale that it rendered the place disorderly.86
Repeal only intensified the policing of gender norms, as regulators sought to reestablish race, class, and gender hierarchies in
public sociability.87 Liquor licensing, historian George Chauncey
argues, provided “a more pervasive and more effective regime of
surveillance and control” than the ad hoc laws and customs of earlier decades.88 Liquor licensees had to be of “good moral character”
and to avoid “disorderly” conduct at their establishments89—vague
requirements that were distinctly gendered. As One Eleven Wines
noted, many of the laws used against sexual minorities also reflected concerns about cisgender heterosexual women’s presence in
public space.90 Under liquor regulations, disorder took the form of
that made it unlawful for any infant or female to drink in a saloon or remain therein over
five minutes).
83. JAN WHITAKER, TEA AT THE BLUE LANTERN INN 5 (2002) (showing that pre-Prohibition, a woman entering a restaurant even with an escort risked her reputation).
84. LEWIS A. ERENBERG, STEPPIN’ OUT: NEW YORK NIGHTLIFE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1890–1930, at 134, 136–37 (1981).
85. KATHY PEISS, CHEAP AMUSEMENTS: WORKING WOMEN AND LEISURE IN TURN-OFTHE-CENTURY NEW YORK 8 (1986).
86. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON
TRIAL 86 (1998).
87. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 80, at 334–37.
88. Id.
89. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet
1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 762 (1997); Rivera, supra note 9, at 1132–33.
90. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d
12, 14 (N.J. 1967) (noting that among the first rules adopted by the N.J. liquor commissioner, for example, was a ban on “prostitutes” and “female impersonators” in licensed premises).
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having on their premises “prostitutes, female impersonators, or
other persons of ill repute.”91
Liquor licensing redefined the bounds of social interaction. First,
repeal worked to segregate gay men and lesbians from the majority
of society and often each other.92 The presence of unaccompanied
women and gay men, who were often labeled “female impersonators,” risked sexual nuisance and thus threatened the status of the
license.93 For gays and lesbians, it was gender performance—dress,
hairstyle, and conversational interests—that indicated sexuality
and had to be controlled and isolated.94 With the exclusion of gender nonconformists from mainstream establishments, bars and
clubs designated for gays and/or lesbians came into existence. Second, many places where liquor was served remained closed to
women. Although by the mid-twentieth century, “women of good
character” could enjoy libations and meals out without “besmirch[ing] their reputations,”95 only men had full access to many
restaurants, clubs, and both working-class and high-end bars.96
Those businesses that did allow women often required that they be
escorted by men.97 The post-Prohibition period further cemented
the link between women’s sexuality and dependency, as women’s
access to public space often was contingent on the presence of a
man.
Concerns about sexuality prompted hysteria during World War
II and a clampdown in the 1950s and early 1960s. The flurried mixing of young women and G.I.s and the notion of “pickups”—or sexually available single women—“captured the public imagination.”98 As Amanda Littauer explains, wartime launched intense

91. Id.
92. CHAUNCEY, supra note 80, at 335 (“Repeal resulted in the segregation and isolation
of the gay social world from the broader social life of the city . . . .”).
93. See Anthony Michael Kreis, Policing the Painted and Powdered, 41 CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing origins and enforcement of these laws against groups
that threatened dominant masculinity whether cisgender women working as men or “fairies”).
94. KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 86, at 86. In this earlier period, gay bars almost
never challenged license revocation because it was expensive and they could expect to lose.
Id.
95. Anderson v. City of Saint Paul, 32 N.W.2d 538, 550–51 (Minn. 1948) (Loring, C.J.,
dissenting).
96. Hickey, supra note 5, at 382–83.
97. Id. at 382.
98. AMANDA H. LITTAUER, BAD GIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SEX, AND REBELLION BEFORE
THE SIXTIES 55–56 (2015).
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scrutiny “not only of the usual ‘delinquent’ suspects—poor girls
and girls of color—but also of white, middle-class girls.”99 By the
1950s, B-girls, or women who induced male customers to buy
drinks for a commission from bars, provoked particular anxiety by
blurring the markers that distinguished immoral from respectable
women.100 Because it had become more common for working
women to socialize in bars and taverns, men could assume that
these conservatively dressed women were sexually available single
women—and be put at risk for predation.101
Cities and states cracked down. Byzantine regulations set
where, when, and how women could be served or stand.102 Lawmakers passed prohibitions on B-girls, and authorities revoked licenses from establishments hosting them and cracked down on
places that prostitutes patronized (even if no solicitation occurred).103 Cisgender women also faced policing by licensees that
extended beyond what the law required. As the New York Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission explained in 1969, proprietors often
took “certain precautions” against the sexual nuisances women
presented.104 They banned women entirely, posted “no unescorted
women” signs, or prohibited women—accompanied or not—at the
bar.105 Linda Kerber explains that “the exclusion of women preserved male space and marked women who moved into it as sexually promiscuous, inviting what we would now call harassment”
well into the 1960s.106 Requirements of escorts instead emphasized

99. Id. at 20.
100. Id. at 52–53.
101. Id. at 67.
102. See, e.g., Randles v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 206 P.2d 1209 (Wash. 1949)
(discussing one such law adopted by state voters). A Kentucky statute, for example, provided
that “no distilled spirits or whiskey shall be sold, given away or served to females” “except
at tables where food may be served”—even though women could sit at a bar and consume
other alcoholic beverages. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Burke, 481 S.W.2d 52, 53
(Ky. 1972).
103. LITTAUER, supra note 98, at 74–80 (documenting this phenomenon in California’s
liquor reform movement); Eskridge, supra note 8, at 871 (describing New York State Liquor
Authority campaign in 1959 and 1960 to revoke the licenses of all bars “patronized by prostitutes and homosexuals”).
104. Dolores Alexander, Her Pause for Refreshment Leads to Fight for Equality,
NEWSDAY (DeCrow), June 13, 1968, at 3B.
105. LITTAUER, supra note 98, at 58; Sepper & Dinner, supra note 1, at 81, 90–93.
106. Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 429, 434–
35 (2002).
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the importance of women’s heterosexual attachment to men to access public spaces.107
Deputized by licensing authorities to surveil morality, bars, taverns, and other drinking establishments targeted sexual minorities even more stringently than cisgender women. States and cities
conducted campaigns to revoke the licenses of any and all bars patronized by gays and lesbians.108 In some cities, policing was so effective as to wipe out gay bar culture.109 Out of fear of being shut
down by authorities, bartenders would deny drinks to patrons suspected of being gay.110 Others would serve them drinks but force
them to sit away from other customers to prevent socializing.111
Fearful of police raids and faced with legal uncertainty, the management of straight bars engaged in self-policing and sometimes
posted signs announcing “We Do Not Serve Homosexuals.”112
The regulation of women and gays through liquor licensing was
in accord with an array of morals regulation that structured gender
in public space. Sodomy laws criminalized sex between two men
(and sometimes women) in every state but Illinois and fostered society-wide discrimination against gays and lesbians.113 As Faith
Seidenberg, a feminist activist in the NOW and attorney, explained, criminal law at the beginning of the 1970s still generally
“followed the principle that there are two kinds of women: ‘good
women’ and ‘bad’”—defining “bad” as “sexually free.”114 For example, teen girls could be detained for up to four years for promiscuous behavior because girls’ sexuality was considered “ungovernable and unmanageable.”115 Vagrancy law enforcement was aimed
107. Hickey, supra note 5, at 395–96.
108. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 870–72 (describing harassment by liquor licensing agents
and police in New York and San Francisco).
109. FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S DEBATE ON
HOMOSEXUALITY 62–63 (2008) (describing shift from Miami’s tolerance of gays to a repressive climate beginning in the summer of 1954 and continuing through the 1960s).
110. CHAUNCEY, supra note 80, at 334–36 (“[B]y threatening proprietors with the revocation of their licenses if its agents discovered that customers were violating the regulations,
it forced proprietors to uphold those regulations on behalf of the state.”).
111. Id. at 341–42.
112. Brief of Org. of Am. Historians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 867, at *25–26.
113. See generally CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 131–36 (2017) (reviewing criminalization and decriminalization of
sodomy).
114. Faith A. Seidenberg, The Myth of the “Evil” Female as Embodied in the Law, 2
ENVTL. L. 218, 218 (1971).
115. Lacey Fosburgh, Criminal Laws Called Discriminatory on Women, (Farians Papers)
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at groups not conforming to sexual mores or unwilling to remain in
the privacy of the closet or the home.116 Gay men faced “vag lewd”
arrests for liaising in bars and on beaches; lesbian women were
charged for dressing, or looking, too masculine.117 Cisgender
women also disproportionally were subject to vagrancy charges.
Although the laws targeted prostitutes, into the 1960s even middle-class, purportedly respectable women could be arrested for
simply being “unescorted . . . in public places.”118
One Eleven Wines and Bayonne form part of a then-unfolding
revolution in law and society. In the late 1960s, legal doctrine was
undergoing a transformation away from morals regulation and toward a status-conduct distinction—phenomena these decisions reflect. The early 1960s launched serious scholarly debate over
whether criminal law had any role to play in enforcing morality
where no harm occurred to others.119 Reformers began to push for
the decriminalization of homosexuality and prostitution. Courts in
some jurisdictions read legislation narrowly and revised evidentiary rules to limit the application of sodomy and prostitution
laws.120 Vagrancy laws—used to police prostitutes, unescorted
women, and homosexuals—fell.121 Obscenity laws narrowed, as
courts rejected governmental arguments that they were necessary
to protect public morality and allowed sexual content and gay magazines to flourish.122 The mere invocation of an interest in morality
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1970 (detailing lawyer Sally Gold’s testimony about New York law to
this effect).
116. GOLUBOFF, supra note 2, at 151.
117. Id. at 47.
118. Id. at 151, 153 (quoting Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae at 46, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67)) (describing several instances).
119. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 158–59 (1967); see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
1–5, 81–83 (1963); EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND
PUBLIC POLICY 79, 114 (1965).
120. William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920–1980, 5
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 280–88 (1993) (documenting in New York case law, parallel trends
toward decriminalization of sodomy and call-girl prostitution through narrow readings of
legislation and changes in evidentiary rules by the courts).
121. See generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 2, at 148–50.
122. Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First Amendment: The First LGBT
Rights Cases Before the Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 229, 230 (2014) (describing the first two gay rights cases before the Supreme Court in 1958 and 1962, that sided
with publishers of gay magazines against charges of obscenity, “as part of the push by midtwentieth century courts to ‘demoralize’ the law of obscenity, that is to reject, minimize, or
ignore the government’s contention that obscenity laws were needed to promote and protect
public morality”).
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no longer sufficed in these areas. Instead, “[a] doctrinal shift requiring empirically-rooted justifications for government action
would make it possible to expose judicial acceptance of particular
government interests to empirical as well as normative critiques.”123 The One Eleven Wines court conducted precisely such
analysis, inquiring into and finding without foundation the government’s reasons for targeting places that gay people gathered.124
This application of liquor-licensing laws, like vagrancy and obscenity, targeted people based on their status (being a homosexual, a
prostitute, or an unescorted woman) rather than their conduct
(committing sodomy, soliciting, or other crimes). As in One Eleven
Wines and Bayonne, courts, scholars, and advocates turned to separating status, which would go unregulated, from conduct, which
could be punished.125
Doctrinal change occurred against a backdrop of the sexual revolution. The mainstream media showed a new openness toward
sexual enjoyment in the 1950s.126 The 1960s saw countercultural
sexual nonconformity from the hippies.127 Not only those on the
margins but also middle-class heterosexual people increasingly
contested the bounds of morality and gender relations.128 Women
and gay liberation movements were stirring.129 The Stonewall Rebellion would soon promote protest, radical claims for acceptance
of gay people, and the formation of new organizations modeled on
the legal liberalism of civil rights.130
One should hesitate, however, to see One Eleven Wines, or even
Bayonne, as merely following societal change. The One Eleven
Wines court chided the government for “disregard[ing] the bur-

123. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2004).
124. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d
12, 23 (N.J. 1967).
125. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, What Is Sexual Orientation?, 106 KY. L.J. 61, 76–77 (2017)
(discussing the ways in which the gay rights movement split conduct from status to challenge their targeting by police).
126. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187, 207.
127. GOLUBOFF, supra note 2, at 158.
128. Id. at 158–59.
129. Id. at 158–60.
130. MICHAEL BRONSKI, A QUEER HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 209–12 (2011) (discussing formation of more radical and also new reformist groups after Stonewall).
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geoning movement towards greater tolerance and deeper understanding” of homosexuality.131 But, though opinions would soon
shift, One Eleven Wines was decidedly ahead of societal norms. Before the 1970s, the media uniformly portrayed gayness as sickness
and criminality.132 As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted with
sympathy, “[I]n our culture homosexuals are indeed unfortunates.”133 Only in the 1970s was there a shift in public polling toward more acceptance of sexual freedom.134 Bayonne might more
accurately be described as following societal change. After all, by
1969, women could be found in bars in other New Jersey cities and
beyond.135 But women’s attempts to access those bars, restaurants,
and clubs viewed as properly male still faced widespread resistance
into the early 1970s. Indeed, the year the case was filed, city voters
had determined to keep women out.
One Eleven Wines and Bayonne gave sexual minorities, gender
nonconformists, and unescorted women greater, but still partial,
rights to access and associate in public places. They protected the
rights of access of heterosexual women and gay men against criminal enforcement so long as these individuals did not actually flout
prohibitions on criminal or lewd behavior. But this limited protection for status left businesses free to impose rules by custom to exclude and to harass individuals because they held hands, danced
together, displayed affection, or had a nonconforming gender image. For good and for ill, legal decisions in favor of gay rights led to
the separation of lesbians and gays from the broader public.136 As
the expert for the plaintiffs in One Eleven Wines noted, “[T]he bars
serve to keep homosexuals ‘in their place’—out of more public
places and, to a certain extent, beyond the public view.”137 As the
next Part explains, statutes prohibiting sex and eventually sexual
131. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d
12, 19 (N.J. 1967).
132. FEJES, supra note 109, at 19; Ball, supra note 122, at 291 (quoting a 1966 Time
magazine article vilifying homosexuality as nothing “but a pernicious sickness”).
133. One Eleven Wines, 235 A.2d at 18.
134. FEJES, supra note 109, at 28.
135. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff, supra note 46, at 13–14 (requesting that the court take
judicial notice of the fact that “virtually every municipality in New Jersey . . . permit women
to be served at bars”).
136. Many gay bars and clubs—including Stonewall—labeled themselves “private clubs”
to protect their freedom to congregate. CAIN, supra note 79, at 76, 90. For an earlier history,
consider that homophile groups were modeled on the Elks and Knights of Columbus (organizations that excluded women, as well as racial and religious minorities). BRONSKI, supra
note 130, at 176.
137. One Eleven Wines, 235 A.2d at 16.

SEPPER DINNER (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2020 1:16 PM

780

[Vol. 54:759

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

orientation discrimination would give activists the capacity to challenge the status-conduct distinction and achieve a more robust conception of freedom in public.
II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW AND THE REINFORCING
NATURE OF PROTECTIONS FOR SEX, GENDER EXPRESSION, AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: THE STORY OF DEBORAH JOHNSON AND
ZANDRA ROLÓN
On January 13, 1983, Deborah Johnson and Zandra Rolón went
out to dinner to celebrate Martin Luther King Junior’s birthday
and their blossoming relationship.138 In a later interview with author Eric Marcus, the two women explained that they were newly
dating and serious.139 The Thursday evening celebration would
kick off their first full weekend together; Rolón picked a special
spot.140 A friend had told her about Papa Choux, a Los Angeles establishment known for its “Intimate Room.”141 The two women arrived for their reservation at one of six private booths, each graced
with sheer curtains.142 There was a violinist, Rolón remembered,
“[a]nd the candle light . . . it was just romantic.”143
A few minutes after seating Johnson and Rolón, their waiter returned and told the women they could not dine in the booth.144 Both
Johnson and Rolón, though only twenty-seven years old at the
time, were already veterans of the LGBTQ civil rights movement.
They asked to see the manager.145 He insisted that it was against
the law for a same-sex couple to dine in the private booth and—as
Johnson and Rolón describe it—did “the back of the bus type of
thing,” saying they were welcome to eat elsewhere in the restaurant but not in the booths.146 Johnson and Rolón retorted, “[T]hat’s
bullshit.”147 They had in mind MLK: “[I]f there’s anything that
138. Making Gay History, The Podcast: Deborah Johnson & Zandra Rólon Amato,
MAKING GAY HISTORY (Nov. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Making Gay History], https://makinggay
history.com/podcast/deborah-johnson-zandra-rolon-amato/ [https://perma.cc/L5BE-ZMLQ].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. (quoting Steve Harvey, Papa Choux Serves Black Crepe at ‘Wake for Romance,’ L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1984).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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King had taught us, it was that we could sit anywhere in the restaurant we wanted to sit.”148 After a heated argument, the women
left with the names of the owner and manager they would sue.149
Johnson and Rolón retained the services of famed feminist attorney, Gloria Allred.150 Allred had already emerged as a high-profile, politically savvy lawyer who challenged unequal treatment of
men and women in public accommodations. Through the 1980s,
Allred would sue a salon that set higher prices for girls than boys
for haircuts, a dry cleaner who charged women more than men for
the same shirt, a restaurant that gave menus listing prices only to
men, a health club that admitted only women, and stores that
banned men but not women in tank tops or required men but not
women to check their bags.151 Criticized for making “mountain[s]
out of . . . molehill[s],”152 Allred understood that public accommodations were an important site for the formation of gender identity
and hierarchy. She was eager to take on the norms that restricted
the access of lesbian and cisgender women alike to commerce and
leisure.153 Allred filed a complaint arguing that Papa Choux had
discriminated against Johnson and Rolón in violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”) that contained a
broad mandate of equal access to public accommodations, and of a
city ordinance that prohibited denial of service based on sexual orientation.154 The socio-legal history of the case, Rolón v. Kulwitzky,
offers a window into the changing regulation of public accommodations in California and, specifically, the intertwined struggles for
women’s equality and LGBTQ people’s freedom.155

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Robin Abcarian, Gloria Allred Is Easy To Criticize, but Just Wait ‘til You Need Her,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-xpm-2013aug-09-la-me-ln-gloria-allred-filner-abcarian-20130807-story.html [https://perma.cc/33TCCFBM].
152. Id.
153. See id. Allred remained an advocate for sex equality throughout her career. In 2004,
she filed suit on behalf of same-sex couples in Los Angeles who were denied marriage licenses, arguing state statutes restricting marriage to a man and a woman violated the state
constitution. Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1282–83 (2010).
154. Myrna Oliver, Judge’s Night Out at a Posh Restaurant All Part of Job, L.A. TIMES,
June 10, 1983, at C1.
155. 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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This Part uses the story of Deborah Johnson and Zandra Rolón’s
activism to explore the evolution of sex equality in California’s public accommodations law. Section A examines the feminist and gay
rights activism that gave rise to new statutory protections. At the
crest of a wave of state legislation adding “sex” to public accommodation statutes, California amended the Unruh Act in 1974 to clarify that it reached sex discrimination. Both proponents and opponents of the 1974 amendment understood that the amendment
concerned not mere classification on the basis of sex but also protections for “lifestyle,” including sexual orientation, marital status,
and family formation. At the same time, activists in Los Angeles
mobilized for specific legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. Section B analyzes interpretive debates in Rolón
about the Unruh Act, the Los Angeles ordinance, and the jurisprudence that developed under these statutes.
This history suggests that protections for sex, gender expression,
and sexual orientation were mutually reinforcing. While the 1950s
and 1960s witnessed a distinction between status and conduct, the
1970s saw jurisprudence that mandated greater tolerance for dissenting gender performance. Activism yielded statutory protections for both sex and sexual orientation and, ultimately in the Rolón decision, recognition for associative freedom in public
accommodations.
A. Feminist and Gay Rights Mobilization for Statutory
Antidiscrimination Protections
In 1974, grassroots advocates, as well as state legislators, mobilized to amend the text of the Unruh Act by adding “sex” to its list
of explicit protections. The push in California came at the height
of feminist public accommodations activism nationwide. In 1969
and 1970, activists across the country had started to protest
against sex discrimination in public. They held “eat-ins” targeting
establishments that ranged from Pittsburgh’s Stouffers to Los Angeles’s Biltmore Hotel.156 As they accessed public space, feminist
activists “fought against the customs and laws that made women’s
sexual identity determinative of their access to public accommodations.”157 They contended that public accommodations had to treat

156. Sepper & Dinner, supra note 1, at 86, 101, 109 n.177.
157. Id. at 114.
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women as individuals, instead of requiring them to gain access
through attachment “to a man as a physical companion or economic proxy.”158 They demanded the right to dress as they wished
and made associational claims that they should not be restricted
to the heterosexual pair.159 They brought lawsuits affirming common law rights of access.160 And they lobbied for state legislation
that would extend the reach of public accommodations statutes to
sex discrimination.161
Local and state legislatures responded swiftly.162 NOW leader
Wilma Scott Heide spearheaded activism in Pittsburgh that led to
the 1969 enactment of the nation’s first city ordinance prohibiting
sex discrimination in public accommodations.163 Colorado amended
its public accommodations statute to reach sex discrimination the
same year.164 The next year, Iowa and New Jersey adopted similar
statutes.165 Between 1971 and 1973, nineteen additional states
across the country passed laws.166 By the decade’s close, thirty-one
states explicitly prohibited sex discrimination in public accommodations.167
Advocates in California found a relatively hospitable legal environment, as the Unruh Act already provided particularly robust
protections for access to public accommodations. Enacted in 1959,
the Unruh Act codified common law protections of equal access to
public accommodations, clarifying that an 1897 statute applied to
all businesses.168 The state legislature worded the Unruh Act
158. Id. at 115.
159. Id. at 126–28.
160. Id. at 102, 123–24.
161. Id. at 81, 97, 103.
162. Id. at 104 nn.140–47 and accompanying text.
163. Id. at 104 nn.140–42 and accompanying text.
164. 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 200.
165. 1970 Iowa Acts 83; 1970 N.J. Laws 296.
166. 1974 Cal. Stat. 2568; 1971 Conn. Pub. Acts 399; 58 Del. Laws 286 (1971); 1972 Idaho
Sess. Laws 980; 1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 764; 1973 Me. Laws 635; 1971 Md. Laws 987; 1971
Mass. Acts 241; 1973 Minn. Laws 2158; 1974 Mont. Laws 696; 1971 Neb. Laws 1; 1973 N.M.
Laws 533; 1971 N.Y. Laws 3107; 1973 Ohio Laws 1884; 1973 Or. Laws 1644; 1972 S.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 11 § 9 46; 1973 Utah Laws 35; 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 418; 1971 W. Va. Acts 373.
167. Sepper & Dinner, supra note 1, at 104.
168. Sande L. Buhai, One Hundred Years of Equality: Saving California’s Statutory Ban
on Arbitrary Discrimination by Businesses, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 113 (2001) (noting that
the enactment meant to clarify the scope of the state’s 1897 statute); see also Curran v.
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) (defining “business establishment[]” under the Act); In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999 (Cal. 1970) (concluding that “a
business generally open to the public may not arbitrarily exclude a would-be customer from
its premises”).
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broadly: “All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free
and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry,
or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.”169 The Unruh Act was
unique among modern state civil rights statutes because it broadly
prohibited arbitrary exclusion or marginalization, even as it barred
discrimination based on specific traits. Individuals did not need to
prove their exclusion was because of a protected trait to make a
claim; arbitrary discrimination was unlawful no matter its basis.
At the same time, the Unruh Act made clear that certain traits—
race, color, etc.—were per se arbitrary and unlawful grounds for
differential treatment.
By the mid-1970s, the rise of sex equality as a social value and
legal ideal had shed new light on both the Unruh Act’s existing
meaning and the limitations in its enforcement. Proponents of legislation to add “sex” to the Unruh Act referenced California’s passage of the Fair Employment Practices Act in 1970 and its ratification of an Equal Rights Amendment to the state constitution in
1972.170 If sex was once considered a reasonable ground for discrimination and thus lawful under the Unruh Act, changing sociolegal norms made clear that it was no longer. From this new vantage, activists drew attention to the rampant sex discrimination,
particularly in housing, which was occurring in violation of the Unruh Act. Landlords routinely turned away single women, female
roommates (some of whom might have been lesbian couples), and
widows and divorced women with children. This forced women to
pay premiums for substandard housing.171 Landlords also some-

169. 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424.
170. INDUS. RELATIONS BD., ENROLLED B. REP. FAR S.B. 1380, S. Reg. Sess. 1973-74-A117 (Cal. 1974) (on file with Cal. State Archives).
171. Hearing on S.B. 1380 Before the Assemb. Jud. Comm., S. Reg. Sess. 1973–74 (Cal.
1974) (on file with Cal. State Archives) (statement of Maxine Brown, Chair of Task Force
on Hous. for Cal. NOW) (“I cannot emphasize strongly enough the harm, the shock, the
sense of helplessness these people experience when this occurs to them.”); Letter from
Brown W. Newcomb, Sonja A. Soehnel, Peter Reid, Bruce N. Berwald, attorneys, Legal Aid
Soc’y of San Mateo Cty., to Assemb. Charles Warren (April 9, 1974) (on file with Cal. State
Archives) (discussing housing premium paid by women); Letter from Robert Ralph, Chairperson, Advisory Council Convention Comm., Women Lawyers’ Ass’n of L.A., to Maxine
Brown (Jan. 17, 1974) (on file with Cal. State Archives); Letter from Mary Anne Roelke,
Housing Coordinator, San Fernando Valley Fair Hous. Council, to Maxine Brown (Nov. 21,
1973) (on file with Cal. State Archives) (describing complaints from clientele about sex dis-
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times refused to rent to unmarried men seeking housing together.172 Victims, moreover, had trouble finding lawyers both because of the lack of a statutory provision for attorneys’ fees and
because of some lawyers’ skepticism that sex discrimination was
truly unlawful.173 Advocates including NOW, the Women’s Lawyer’s Association of Los Angeles, the California Commission on the
Status of Women, the American Civil Liberties Union, the California Rural Legal Association, and numerous fair housing organizations turned to the legislature.174
The amendment’s sponsors argued that the addition of “sex”
would clarify to businesses, attorneys, and the courts that sex discrimination fell within the Unruh Act’s existing prohibition on arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations.175 Legislators referred in particular to the California Supreme Court’s decision in
In re Cox, which challenged the arrest of Theodore William Cox
pursuant to a trespass ordinance that criminalized remaining
upon a business premises after being asked to leave.176 Cox had
refused to leave the Northgate Shopping Center and instead sat on
a mall bench talking with his friend, whose appearance suggested
he was a hippie.177 The question was whether the ejection of Cox
and his friend was reasonable under the Unruh Act.178 In ruling
for Cox, the California Supreme Court held that the enumeration
of specific classes was merely illustrative and not a limitation on
the scope of the Unruh Act’s coverage.179 Citing this holding, legislators argued that the addition of “sex” would not bring new forms
crimination in housing); Letter from Dolly Sacks, Coordinator, Stanford Mid-Peninsula Urban Coal., to Maxine Brown (July 24, 1973) (on file with Cal. State Archives) (describing
rampant sex discrimination in housing); Letter from Dan Williams, President, Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing, to Assemb. Charles Warren (Mar. 14, 1974) (on file with Cal.
State Archives) (discussing the same housing premium paid by women).
172. Memorandum from Maxine Brown to the S. Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1974) (on
file with Cal. State Archives) (describing sex discrimination against men as well as women,
including an Episcopal priest who wanted to rent along with his brother) (on file with Cal.
State Archives).
173. See Letter from Women Lawyers’ Ass’n of Los Angeles to Maxine Brown (containing
Res. No. 5-3) (on file with Cal. State Archives).
174. Letter from Sen. Nicholas C. Petris to Governor Ronald Reagan (Sept. 11, 1974) (on
file with Cal. State Archives).
175. Memorandum from George H. Murphy, Legis. Counsel of Cal., to Sen. Nicholas C.
Petris (Aug. 17, 1973) [hereinafter Aug. 1973 Memorandum from Murphy] (on file with Cal.
State Archives); Buhai, supra note 168, at 114.
176. 474 P.2d 992, 993–95 (Cal. 1970).
177. See id. at 994.
178. Id. at 993.
179. Id. at 999.
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of discrimination within the Unruh Act’s coverage but rather ensure sex discrimination was understood to be arbitrary.180
The prominent place of In re Cox in the legislative history of the
1974 amendment is significant because of its capacious interpretation of equality in public. Previous cases such as Stoumen, One
Eleven Wines, and Bayonne had separated status from conduct to
recognize a right to access the public. Individuals still could face
ejection for their conduct, if not their group status. Reflecting the
1960s social activism demanding tolerance and respect for social
difference,181 In re Cox affirmed a far more expansive right to inclusion in public accommodations. Recognizing that the shopping
mall performed “a significant public function” in its provision of
“food, clothing and other commodities,”182 In re Cox validated the
individual’s right to inclusion notwithstanding one’s dissenting image, expression, and behavior: “The shopping center may no more
exclude individuals who wear long hair or unconventional dress,
[than those] who are black, . . . members of the John Birch Society,
or . . . belong to the American Civil Liberties Union . . . .”183 The
court affirmed individuals’ rights to express difference in public—
that is, to engage in conduct that reflected their personal identity
and commitments. The California legislature’s reliance on the decision set the stage for an interpretation of “sex” that extended far
beyond formal classification of males and females.
Both sides of the legislative debate—proponents and opponents—interpreted the 1974 bill to reach associational rights and
gender performance. The California Real Estate Association
(“CREA”) conceded the validity of legislation barring formal classification on the basis of sex—for example, renting to single men but
not to single women. But CREA distinguished between “sex” and
what it called “life style[sic].”184 It sponsored an amendment to the

180. Memorandum from George H. Murphy, Legis. Counsel of Cal., to Sen. Nicholas C.
Petris (July 13, 1973) [hereinafter July 1973 Memorandum from Murphy] (on file with Cal.
State Archives); Aug. 1973 Memorandum from Murphy, supra note 175; Press Release, Antidiscrimination Bill Approved (on file with Cal. State Archives).
181. On the relationship between demands for individual freedom and gay rights activism in the sixties, see GOLUBOFF, supra note 2; Katherine Turk, “Our Militancy Is Our
Openness”: Gay Employment Rights Activism in California and the Question of Sexual Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 423, 429–30 (2013) (arguing that gay
activists fought for both nondiscrimination and “the right to be openly gay at work”).
182. In re Cox, 474 P.2d at 1001.
183. Id.
184. Letter from Dugald Gillies, Vice President of Governmental Relations, CREA, to
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bill that created exceptions for single-sex housing and for housing
within inadequate single-sex bathroom facilities as well as “[s]election for multiple occupancy of a unit of housing on the basis of a
blood or marital relationship between the prospective occupants,
or lack of such relationship . . . .”185 CREA intended this last exemption to prevent interpretation of “sex” under the Unruh Act to
reach protections for homosexuality. CREA contrasted individual
rights recognized in Stoumen “to access . . . restaurants and bars
so long as [gay men] are not in violation of the law by their conduct”
and those of gay men to cohabitate together, which in itself would
“creat[e] strong implications” of illegality.186 State legislative counsel determined that blanket exceptions were unnecessary and misguided,187 reasoning that the factual context should determine
whether single-sex housing or discrimination based on marital status or blood relationship were justified.188 In rejecting a statutory
design that distinguished between sex on the one hand and marital
status or gender conformity on the other, the legislature affirmed
a broader conception of the Act’s protections.
As the debates about sex and the Unruh Act unfolded, gay rights
activists in Los Angeles pressed the city to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination explicitly. Despite Stoumen, One Eleven Wines,
In re Cox, and similar cases, structures of discrimination nationwide had eroded only slowly and in piecemeal fashion for LGBTQ
people. Gays continued to experience violence and police intrusion
in bars and other public spaces for decades, albeit in a less sustained fashion than during the 1950s and 1960s. The persistence
of anti-sodomy laws in many jurisdictions meant that socialization
in public did not promise full freedom to pursue intimate relationships in private.189 In many places, state courts proved reluctant to

Roger T. Mason, President, Mason and Associates Realtors (Aug. 1, 1973) [hereinafter Letter from Gillies] (on file with Cal. State Archives).
185. Amendments to S. BILL NO. 1380, as amended in Senate June 6, 1973 (on file with
Cal. State Archives).
186. Letter from Gillies, supra note 184.
187. Memorandum from George H. Murphy, Legis. Counsel of Cal., to Sen. Nicholas C.
Petris (Nov. 26, 1973) (on file with Cal. State Archives).
188. Letter from Robert H. Frank to Maxine Brown (Dec. 13, 1973) (on file with Cal.
State Archives); see also July 1973 Memorandum from Murphy, supra note 180; Letter from
Sen. Nicholas C. Petris to Dugald Gillies, Cal. Real Estate Assoc. (Jan. 9, 1974) (on file with
Cal. State Archives) (“I do not intend to carry a bill which has the effect of weakening the
people’s protection against arbitrary discrimination.”).
189. See KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 86, at 94.

SEPPER DINNER (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2020 1:16 PM

788

[Vol. 54:759

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

restrain states’ exercise of liquor licensing power in ways that discriminated against LGBTQ people.190 Just as feminist activists in
California argued for the necessity of explicit textual protections
for sex within the Unruh Act, so too did gay rights activists argue
that existing public accommodations laws—even those state statutes that referenced “sex” explicitly—were not enough.
Agitation for gay rights in public accommodations began as early
as 1967 amidst grassroots resistance against police harassment.191
Gay rights activism did not always align with feminist activism
and, at times, came into conflict with it. While 1970s feminist activism sought to dismantle sex segregation,192 gay rights proponents often fought to preserve their own public spaces—the gay
and lesbian bars and community groups where identity was
formed.
In practice, women’s integration collided with realms of gay
male freedom. Even during the decades of rampant liquor enforcement, many night clubs and high-class bars, in particular those in
grand hotels, were left alone and developed reputations for encounters between respectable gay men.193 In 1969, when one hotel bar
justified its refusal to serve unescorted women at the bar as motivated by “the desire to protect [its] bar patrons from being accosted
and solicited by streetwalkers[,]”194 Ira Glasser of the New York
Civil Liberties Union replied, “Your worry about losing your liquor

190. For example, the same year as One Eleven Wines, a Florida court came to the opposite conclusion in ways that again link the regulation of heterosexual women and gay people.
Miami prohibited liquor licensees from knowingly employing or selling alcohol to a homosexual person or allowing two or more to congregate in the place of business. Inman v. City
of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Richard Inman challenged the ordinance
as denying him the right to “‘visit and enjoy by himself or with his friends who are similarly
situated the public places of amusement.” Id. at 51. Here, Inman’s case was controlled by
City of Miami v. Kayfetz, a 1957 decision of the Supreme Court of Florida upholding as a
reasonable exercise of police power Miami’s “B girl” ordinance, which prohibited female bar
employees from mingling or fraternizing with customers and all women from frequenting or
loitering in any tavern, cabaret or nightclub to solicit drinks. 92 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1957). Sex
and sexual orientation classifications had a direct relationship.
191. Ziegler, supra note 125, at 94–95.
192. Smaller groups of cultural feminists in the mid-1970s would seek to carve out allwomen cafés, restaurants, and community centers, but the dominant trend in the first half
of the decade was to demand full sex integration of the public sphere. For an argument about
the importance of spatial analysis to the history of feminism and the significance of separatism, see ANNE ENKE, FINDING THE MOVEMENT: SEXUALITY, CONTESTED SPACE, AND
FEMINIST ACTIVISM 5–7, 10–11 (2007).
193. CHAUNCEY, supra note 80, at 349–50.
194. Letter from Charles E. Frowenfeld, Director of Catering, Belmont Plaza, to Ira
Glasser, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union (June 9, 1970) (on file with DeCrow Papers).
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license is legitimate. But . . . you do not appear concerned that a
single gentleman might proposition a lady or, for that matter, another gentleman”195—referring obliquely to the cruising known to
take place in hotel bars.196 Feminist protests in 1969 and the early
1970s targeted many of these places—including the Biltmore Hotel
in Los Angeles, the Monteleone’s Carousel bar in New Orleans, and
the Oak Room at the Plaza in New York City.197 While bars and
taverns remained male preserves into the 1970s,198 the move to
make drinking establishments more friendly to women further isolated gay men and women. Singles bars, for example, took off with
an emphasis on pairing single men with single women and a presumption of heterosexuality.199
While gay rights groups began to mobilize for antidiscrimination
legislation in the late 1960s,200 it was not until the mid-1970s that
local ordinances modeled on federal civil rights legislation proliferated.201 Liberal university towns and large cities were the first
movers.202 The District of Columbia adopted a bill in 1973 that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination.203 Minneapolis enacted
a law in 1974 with “so little news coverage that it was a kind of
victory without a battle.”204 The quiet nature of the passage was
not unusual. Advocates often added these bases of discrimination
during then-ongoing efforts by cities to revise and modernize their
codes.205 Sometimes, however, protections for gay people responded
to horrific acts of anti-gay violence.206 While some jurisdictions
used the language of “sexual orientation,” others used “sexual pref-

195. Letter from Ira Glasser, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, to Charles E. Frowenfeld, Director of Catering, Belmont Plaza (June 30, 1970) (on file with DeCrow Papers).
196. Id.
197. CHRISTINE SISMONDO, AMERICA WALKS INTO A BAR 259 (2011).
198. LITTAUER, supra note 98, at 79 (noting that into 1970s bars remained male preserves).
199. SISMONDO, supra note 197, at 269–70.
200. DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOT THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 244–49
(2d ed. 2010); FEJES, supra note 109, at 53–54.
201. BRONSKI, supra note 130, at 219.
202. Id.
203. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 926–27.
204. DICK HEWETSON, HISTORY OF THE GAY MOVEMENT IN MINNESOTA AND THE ROLE OF
THE MINNESOTA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 76 (Dr. Matthew Stark et al. eds., 2013).
205. FEJES, supra note 109, at 54.
206. The Tucson City Council in Arizona, for example, passed a comprehensive antidiscrimination ordinance following four teenagers’ murder of a gay man outside a bar. FEJES,
supra note 109, at 56.
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erence,” a term lesbian activists advanced as a way to reject medical models and further dignify gay relationships.207 By 1977, thirtynine cities had some kind of legislation prohibiting discrimination
against gay people.208 Although activists attempted to secure state
legislation,209 only in 1982 would the first state pass such protections, with the second to follow in 1989.210
This brief period in the 1970s of including gays and lesbians
within local antidiscrimination legislation reflected an emergent
distinction between civil rights and substantive morality. When
New York City considered amending its ordinance, The New York
Times cast the issue as one of civil rights, not the moral rightness
or wrongness of gay lifestyles.211 This distinction grew increasingly
influential. In 1974, the conservative commentator William Safire
argued that “normal” people should work to preserve heterosexuality by “counter[ing] [gays’] new proselytization with some mission work of our own . . . .”212 Safire nonetheless advocated extending antidiscrimination laws to gays and lesbians: “when we fail to
give them the protection of the law, then it is the law that is
queer.”213 Opponents of these measures instead argued that antidiscrimination protections were intimately linked to immorality
and “deviant sexuality,” granting “public license to uninhibited
manifestations of sexual preference or sexual relationships.”214
With the rise of the Religious Right and Anita Bryant’s campaign
against a Miami-Dade County sexual orientation antidiscrimination ordinance, progress toward gay rights measures stalled and in
some places was reversed.215 By the 1980s, conservatives proved

207. Ziegler, supra note 125, at 97.
208. PA. NOW TIMES (May–June 1977), available in JEAN WITTER PAPERS (University of
Pittsburgh Archives and Special Collections, Box 6, Folder 26).
209. HEWETSON, supra note 204, at 76–77 (discussing advocacy for and failure of gay
rights bills in Minnesota); Gay Rights Bills Before the Massachusetts Legislature: 1974,
available in RECORDS BOS. NOW (Harvard University Library, Folder 490) (describing Massachusetts law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual preference in employment, labor
unions, insurance, marketing, housing, leasing of commercial space, and credit).
210. See Act of Nov. 15, 1989, ch. 516, 1989 Mass. Acts 796; Act of Mar. 12, 1982, ch. 112,
1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901.
211. Editorial, Matter of Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1974, at 36, available
in RECORDS BOS. NOW (Harvard University Library, Folder 490).
212. William Safire, Gays Gaining More Rights, BOS. HERALD AM., Apr. 18, 1974, available in RECORDS BOS. NOW (Harvard University Library, Folder 490).
213. Id.
214. Ziegler, supra note 125, at 96.
215. See generally FEJES, supra note 109, at 85–212 (recounting the history of Anita Bryant and Religious Right leaders’ campaign against gay rights measures).
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effective at convincing the public that LGBT people were demanding “special rights,” rather than rights available to all.216
National trends toward morals deregulation, civil rights consciousness, and religion-based opposition manifested in the debate
over the Los Angeles ordinance. In 1979, advocates for this ordinance, modeled on laws in Berkeley and San Francisco, argued
that state and federal restraints on “arbitrary discrimination” were
“inadequate to meet the particular problems of discrimination
based on sex and sexual orientation.”217 The ordinance defined
“sexual orientation” to reach gender performance and association:
“‘[S]exual orientation’ shall mean an individual having or manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to another consenting
adult person or persons, or having or manifesting a preference for
such attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not associated with one’s biological maleness or one’s biological femaleness.”218 Prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, employment, housing, real estate, and credit transactions, the
ordinance passed the City Council by a vote of thirteen to two over
the objections of those who decried it as an immoral assault on
Judeo-Christian values.219
By the decade’s close, both feminist and LGBTQ activists had
made headway toward equality in public. Jurisprudence had
evolved from the status-conduct distinction in Stoumen, to the affirmation of individual rights to gender nonconformity in In re Cox.
Activists had realized the inclusion of explicit textual protections
for “sex” in the Unruh Act, and the legislative history suggested
the Act protected not only women’s equal rights to enjoy public accommodations but also rights related to gender expression, marital
status, family formation, and association (including with gays and
lesbians). In addition, city ordinances, as in Los Angeles, provided
specific protections for sexual orientation. Activists and legislators
alike intended the Unruh Act’s broad right to access public accom-

216. KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 86, at 133–41; see also RIMMERMAN, supra note 22,
at 127 (“By the early 1980s, [Richard] Viguerie had articulated the ‘special rights’ argument
that the Christian Right would embrace to fight efforts to overturn bans on polices that
discriminated against [gays] . . . .”) (citation omitted).
217. Sid Bernstein, City Gay Rights Measure Wins Tentative Approval, L.A. TIMES, May
24, 1979, at A3.
218. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 12, § 49.71.4 (1979).
219. Erwin Baker, Council OKs Gay Rights Ordinance, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1979, at A1.
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modations, its textual protections for sex, and the Los Angeles ordinance’s ban on sexual orientation discrimination to be mutually
reinforcing.
B. Litigation to Realize LGBT People’s Freedom of Expression in
Public
When Johnson and Rolón filed suit against Papa Choux in 1983,
they invoked the Unruh Act, as amended in 1974, and the Los Angeles ordinance to seek recognition and inclusion for their full
selves in public. Both women understood their gender, sexual, and
racial identities as well as their romantic relationship in intersectional ways. Johnson grew up in Los Angeles in an “upper-middleclass bourgeois black household—a very well-rooted, extremely
well-connected family.”220 She came out in the mid-1970s in her
early twenties and had started a social club for 600 lesbian women,
where she ultimately met Rolón.221 Rolón was raised among a large
extended Mexican-American family in Brownsville, Texas.222 She
had heard stories about her grandfather’s experiences of racial segregation, and related the incident at Papa Choux to her family history.223 Johnson and Rolón both connected the sex-based discrimination they faced at Papa Choux to the racial discrimination they
encountered within the LGBTQ community.224 They had each
“come to the gay and lesbian community naively, expecting it to be
more sensitive,” but they had encountered significant racism including, for example, at a famous gay club, Studio One, that admitted people of color only a single night of the week—the night that
some customers referred to as “plantation night.”225 When Johnson
and Rolón challenged Papa Choux, they did not analogize to race,
but instead asserted rights to full expression as individuals and as
a couple in public.226

220. Making Gay History, supra note 138.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. Popular nightclub Studio One used various forms of harassment, such as asking
for multiple IDs, to exclude people of color most nights of the week and then used advertisement of a DJ or music to signal the night that they were welcome. Id.
225. Id.
226. Press Release, Gloria Allred, Announcing Lawsuit Against Papa Choux Restaurant
(June 9, 1983) [hereinafter Allred Press Release], https://makinggayhistory.com/podcast/
deborah-johnson-zandra-rolon-amato/ [https://perma.cc/L5BE-ZMLQ].
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In translating Johnson and Rolón’s grievance into a legal claim,
Gloria Allred had at her disposal a slew of recent cases under the
Unruh Act that affirmed associative freedom in public accommodations. In the 1970s and 1980s, California courts held unlawful
businesses’ exclusion of individuals based on the simple excuse of
“I don’t like you” or “I don’t like your kind.”227 For example, in Hubert v. Williams involving a landlord’s eviction of a quadriplegic
tenant and his lesbian home attendant,228 the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles confronted the question of whether the Unruh Act’s protections extended to “homosexuals as tenants in rental housing” and
to the individuals associated with them.229 In analyzing this issue,
the court drew upon a Supreme Court of California decision of the
same year, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, which determined a
landlord’s policy of excluding families with minor children was unlawful.230 Wolfson concluded that the Unruh Act did not permit the
exclusion of a class of persons from a business enterprise just because members of the class were more likely than the general population to engage in misconduct.231 The Hubert court further interpreted Wolfson’s citation to In re Cox, which in turn cited to
Stoumen, “as clearly indicating homosexuals, as a class, are protected from arbitrary discrimination.”232 In cases concerning gay
men, hippies, families with children, lesbians, and disabled persons,233 California courts interrogated public accommodations’ reasons for excluding individuals on the basis of identity alone. Hubert
in particular went beyond the status-conduct distinction and even
tolerance for dissenting gender performance to affirm the rights of

227. Buhai, supra note 168, at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., In re
Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 993, 999 (Cal. 1970) (holding a business may not arbitrarily exclude
customers from its premises under the Unruh Act).
228. 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1982).
229. Id. at 162, 164.
230. Id. at 162 (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 124 (Cal. 1982)).
231. Wolfson, 640 P.2d at 125–26.
232. Hubert, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 162–63, 163 n.1.
233. O’Connor v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 662 P.2d 427, 428–29, 431 (Cal. 1983) (age);
Long v. Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 97–99, 101–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (occupation as
police officer), reh’g denied, No. G006130, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 202, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 19, 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20, 20–
22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (association with African Americans); see Opinion No. SO 75-6, 58
Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 608, 613 (1975) (marital status); Opinion No. SO 75-72, 59 Ops. Cal.
Att’y Gen. 70, 71 (1976) (student status); Opinion No. SO 75-81, 59 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 223,
224–25 (1976) (welfare recipient status); see also Buhai, supra note 168, at 114–15, 115
nn.45–50 (listing cases).

SEPPER DINNER (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2020 1:16 PM

794

[Vol. 54:759

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

individuals to be free from discrimination based on whom they associated with in public.234
Deborah Johnson and Zandra Rolón’s lawsuit drew on this jurisprudence to insist that Papa Choux violated the law when it denied
them service in the Intimate Room. Allred’s press release emphasized “bias by businesses against homosexuals.”235 Yet it also made
arguments grounded in associational rights and nondiscrimination
on the basis of gender: “[W]e believe that every person has the right
to associate with the person of their choice, and that it is wrong
and illegal to deny them the right to service in certain sections of
restaurants for solely arbitrary reasons, such as sex, sex preference
or race.”236 The ban on “two people of the same sex” sitting together
violated the Unruh Act for the same reason that a ban on two African Americans or Catholics eating together would.237 Rather than
cleanly separate sex and gender, the legal framing of the couple’s
lawsuit spoke to the blurry boundaries between these categories.
It relied on the Unruh Act’s protection against arbitrary exclusion
as well as its prohibitions on discrimination based on the particular traits of sex and sexual orientation.238 Johnson and Rolón’s
claim—that a romantic association between women constituted an
arbitrary basis for exclusion—evinced shifting social mores.
From the start, management fought with “boxing gloves” to preserve Papa Choux’s Intimate Room as a space for heterosexual romance.239 In June 1983, following the initiation of the lawsuit, Walter Kulwitzky (Managing Director) and Seymour Jacoby (Owner)
took out a newspaper advertisement expressing their opposition to
serving same-sex couples in the private dining area: “[T]his charade . . . would certainly make a mockery of true romantic dining.”240 Kulwitzky and Jacoby’s resistance exemplified a common
social objection to gay and lesbian rights—that tolerance for homosexual attraction threatened the vitality of heterosexuality.
Their attorney, Arnold Barry Gold, endeavored to reframe the
Unruh Act’s protections as confined to particular classes. He argued that the Act protected against discrimination on the basis of
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Hubert, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 162–64, 163 n.1.
Allred Press Release, supra note 226.
Id.
Id.
Rolón v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 217–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Making Gay History, supra note 138.
Id.
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sex, not sexual orientation, and that Papa Choux’s policy was not
sex discriminatory because it excluded male as well as female couples.241 Further, the restaurant’s policy was a “‘reasonable regulation’ of public (homosexual) behavior that is unacceptable to society.”242 Although California had legalized consensual sex between
adults in 1975, the defendant’s arguments initially won out. The
trial judge, Judge Bruce R. Geernaert, visited Papa Choux’s Intimate Room to investigate its purpose and the degree to which a
gay couple would be secluded from sight by others.243 Geernaert
commented at trial, “The courts really can’t be too far out ahead of
what society accepts as acceptable conduct when we are dealing
with one’s right to conduct a business and try to be successful at
it.”244 He therefore agreed with the defendants that the Unruh
Act’s protections extended only to the enumerated trait of “sex,”
not sexual orientation.245 Both Gold and the trial judge used the
1974 amendment in a conservative manner, cabining the Act’s
reach to enumerated classes. Ironically, the court simultaneously
evaded the Los Angeles ordinance’s mandate to extend antidiscrimination protections to gay and lesbian people, holding that it
was preempted by state law.246
In March 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed.247 Another provision of the California Code provided that actions pursuant to the
Unruh Act did not preclude other “independent” available remedies.248 While it did not revisit the lower court’s decision on the Unruh Act, the Court of Appeals held that the Los Angeles ordinance
explicitly barring sexual orientation discrimination gave Johnson
and Rolón an alternative remedy.249 The court rejected the defendant’s arguments that its exclusionary policy was meant to prevent
241. James W. Meeker et al., State Law and Local Ordinances in California Barring
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 753 (1985);
Oliver, supra note 154, at C1.
242. Oliver, supra note 154, at C1.
243. Id. (describing the judge’s visit).
244. See Meeker et al., supra note 241, at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Rolón v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see also Meeker et
al., supra note 241, at 753 (“[S]exual preference is not in the statute and is not inferentially
in the statute.”) (citing the Record in the case).
246. See Meeker et al., supra note 241, at 753.
247. Rolón, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 217, 219.
248. Id. at 218 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(e)).
249. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 12, § 49.71.4 (1979); Rolón, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 218
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations as
well as employment, housing and real estate transactions, city facilities and services, and
educational institutions). Advocates for the Los Angeles ordinance, modeled on ordinances
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sexual acts between gay and lesbian couples, observing that despite its name the Intimate Room allowed for little intimacy.250 After the California Supreme Court subsequently denied the defendants’ motion for rehearing, Papa Choux closed its Intimate Room
rather than open to same-sex couples.251 The restaurant held “A
Wake for Romance,” complete with a funeral wreath and flowers,
a eulogy by an undertaker, and free drinks for attendees.252
CONCLUSION
Over the course of three decades, movements for gay and
women’s liberation asserted rights to inclusion in the market. They
insisted that any exclusion be based on specific acts of wrongdoing
rather than identity alone. In so doing, they set in motion a shifting
target for what the courts and society considered “rational” exclusion from the public. The status-conduct distinction realized in the
1950s and 1960s, in landmark decisions including Stoumen, One
Eleven Wines, and Bayonne, offered some measure of enjoyment of
and equality in public space, but did not suffice to guarantee freedom of expression and of association. In the 1970s, plaintiffs such
as Theodore Cox demanded access to public spaces notwithstanding gender nonconformity. Feminist and LGBTQ activists worked
for antidiscrimination laws to eradicate customs of gender and sexuality policing then-widespread in the market. Advocates and opponents of 1970s reforms prohibiting “sex” and “sexual orientation”
discrimination understood those statutes to reach not only formal
classification but also association, marital status, and family formation. As the 1980s began, plaintiffs such as Deborah Johnson
and Zandra Rolón used protections for “sex” and “sexual orientation” interchangeably to assert rights to associate as same-sex couples in public.

passed in Berkeley and San Francisco, had argued that state and federal restraints on “arbitrary discrimination” were “inadequate to meet the particular problems of discrimination
based on sex and sexual orientation.” Bernstein, supra note 217, at A3. The ordinance
passed the City Council by a vote of thirteen to two over the objections of opponents who
decried it as an immoral assault on Judeo-Christian values. Baker, supra note 219, at A1.
250. Rolón, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court observed that the Intimate Room was still
open for observation and that the restaurant’s policy also excluded straight couples with
children from that space; clearly the exclusions were meant to do more than prevent acts of
sexual intimacy. Id.
251. Meeker, supra note 241, at 754; Harvey, supra note 141.
252. Harvey, supra note 141.
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The stories of One Eleven Wines, Bayonne, and Rolón illustrate
that the regulation and deregulation of cisgender women and
LGBTQ people must be told as one history. These episodes—offering an entry point into the history of liquor licensing in New Jersey
and public accommodations law in California—highlight that feminist and LGBTQ legal victories evolved cyclically and interdependently, rather than in a linear and isolated manner. Law and
custom regulating sexual respectability and gender roles constrained the freedom of straight women, gay men and lesbians, and
all people whose attire bent, or crossed, conventional gender performance. Conversely, the struggles of cisgender women and of gay
and lesbian people for full inclusion reinforced one another. Public
accommodations lawsuits alleging sex discrimination succeeded in
ending gendered norms in some places, potentially opening space
for queer people. Women suspected of prostitution, gay men, hippies, single women out on the town, lesbian couples enjoying romantic dinners, even parents with children in adult-only spaces—
used the precedents each other set to win freedom in public.

